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ABSTRACT: To behave in an adaptive way an animal must refer to information. Consider what 
happens when a motorist comes to traffic lights at red. The motorist usually stops. Stopping avoids the 
high risk of damage and injury at the cost of one or two minutes. So stopping at red traffic lights is the 
best way for the motorist to behave. There is a relation between the changing pattern of red, green and 
amber and the best thing to do. This relation is like an abstract signpost that implies what to do. Traffic 
lights imply and motorists infer. The information that means something is this 'traffic lights' kind of 
implication that in an abstract way points to the best way to behave. Information of this kind is adaptive 
information. 
Information varies in accuracy, may be unreliable and is often redundant. So how much is a good 
thing? The appendix proves mathematically that the more information an animal refers to, the closer to 
the adaptive way it can behave. Three major predictions follow. First, animals refer to all the 
information available; second, they ignore variables that have only a random association with adaptive 
behaviour; and third, they interpret information in an adaptive way. In evolutionary time the animal's 
characters that perceive and interpret its world could have evolved until the animal now does infer what 
the information implies, and selection ensures that this happens. 
* * * 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When a newly hatched Herring Gull (Larus argentatus) surveys its world, at some moment it sees a 
red patch near the end of its parent's yellow bill. The chick interprets this red patch as an object to be 
pecked at and when it does so the parent regurgitates an item of food that the chick eats (Tinbergen & 
Perdeck 1950). It is obvious enough that obtaining the food is good for the chick: if it did not eat, it 
would soon die of starvation. Adaptive behaviour can be defined as that which increases an animal's 
contribution to future generations by enhancing its survival or reproduction. This functional approach to 
behaviour is called behavioural ecology (Krebs & Davies 1984) or sociobiology (Wilson 1975). Clearly 
the behaviour of the chick that pecks at the red spot on its parent's bill is functional in this way, and so 
too is the usual behaviour of all animals. But is behaviour a consequence of function alone? 
The red patch on the Herring Gull's bill is not only the place that supplies regurgitated food, but is 
also an excellent indicator or clue for a good place for the chick to peck. The red patch implies that this 
is a good place, and that is what the chick infers. The characters of the chick that do the inferring - for 
instance, the eyes that perceive the red patch and the central nervous system that interprets it in this 
way - constitute part of the mechanism that the chick uses to regulate its behaviour. 
But what is this implication that the red patch has for the chick? Puffy white clouds in blue skies do 
not have it, nor do red spots of lichen on rocks. Nor does the implication depend at all on whether or not 
the chick does any inferring. The implication is still there and the chick can refer to it only if its 
characters have evolved that way. Implication means much the same as the everyday use of the term 
information. First, we enlarge on what this everyday information is; then, we show how much of it an 
animal ought to refer to. Lastly, we show that now one can predict which variables are the ones that 
animals do refer to. 
2. W H A T  IS ADAPTIVE INFORMATION? 
Infer and imply 
It is important to clearly distinguish between infer and imply. When a motorist comes to traffic lights at 
red, the motorist usually stops. This is hardly surprising; all motorists know that in the circumstances of 
red traffic lights, stopping is the best thing to do because one avoids injury, damage and traffic fines at 
the cost of only one or two minutes. This relation between the traffic lights at red and the best thing for 
the motorist to do is like an abstract signpost, and it is this relation or abstract signpost that is the 
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implication of the red traffic lights. Motorists usually do infer this and stop. In other words, they usually 
refer to the traffic lights and then make up their minds to stop. Implication is an abstract property of 
something that someone could infer when making up his or her mind in a logical way. Inference is the 
psychological process of making up one's mind. It is an individual's interpretation of an object, or rather 
a pattern of objects; this interpretation is its estimate of the implication. 
For the Herring Gull chick, the red spot on its parent's bill does not incorporate any kind of 
mechanism that compels the chick to peck at it. It is the chick that decides to peck at the red spot. The 
characters that perceive the red spot and interpret it in this way are part of the chick. In other words, 
information is permissive in that its only role is to be available in the same way as a red traffic light is 
available for a motorist to refer to; the light plays no active part in the decision of the motorist to stop or 
drive through it. 
Traffic lights at red and the implication for the motorist to stop are separate and distinct. Common 
usage calls traffic lights at red or some other particular pattern of objects simply as 'traffic lights at red' 
or 'a variable', 'pattern of variables', and so on; one is silent about whether or not any implication 
occurs. When one wants to include what the traffic lights at red imply for a motorist, or perhaps more 
cautiously to acknowledge that some kind of implication may occur, then the word 'clue' is appropriate. 
When one wants to refer only to what the traffic lights at red imply for the motorist, then the term 'item 
of information' is appropriate. As will be shown later, 'information' is reserved for the implication that 
occurs from all the available items of information taken as a whole. 
So an item of information is an abstract signpost or implication. It is a relation: the relation of the red 
spot on the yellow bill with the best place to peck, and the relation between the traffic lights at red and 
the best thing for the motorist to do. Information is not the red spot on the yellow bill itself nor the 
traffic lights at red. No animal can see an implication, but it can have the kind of eyes that see red spots 
and it can have propensities in its central nervous system to interpret these red spots in the particular 
way that infers the best thing to do. It can also have built-in propensities to adjust and improve the way 
it does so, in other words, propensities to learn only certain things (see Hume 1748 p. 108; Hinde & 
Stevenson-Hinde 1973). 
The best response to a traffic light varies with its colour: when the light is red, it is time to stop; when 
the light is green, it is time to go. This covariance of patterns persists whether the motorist draws the 
correct inference or not. With the Herring Gull, the covariance in pattern and response is over space not 
time. Where the bill is red, it is the place to peck; where the Gull is not red, it is not the place to peck. If 
the light were stuck on red, or the Gull were red all over, how could redness relate to the best response 
or to anything else at all? With constant redness there could be no implication. An implication is 
possible only if two or more alternative patterns, sequences, arrangements or the like occur. And they 
must in some way vary with the best response. If this covariance is negative, the animal can simply 
reverse it in interpretation; if it is even more abstruse the animal will require an interpretation that is 
correspondingly subtle. 
On the other hand if the traffic light goes from red to green, but does so at random, or if pecking at the 
gull's red spot does not alter the probability that the parent will regurgitate food, there is no relation with 
the best response and so no implication. Clearly if no implication exists, no inference is possible. For 
information to exist, a pattern of variables must relate to a best response, not necessarily all the time, but 
at least better than chance. (See Young 1987, pp 6-8,14-15; Dretske 1983). 
Context or circumstrrnces 
Early in the breeding season, a Herring Gull will eat an egg placed in its nest (Paludin 1951, in 
Parsons 1976). As day length changes, the way that it is adaptive for the gull to interpret an egg in its 
nest also changes. During the ten days or so before it lays its own eggs, the Herring Gull will incubate 
an egg placed in its nest. Similarly, when a Gannet sees an egg in its nest, it incubates the egg by placing 
the webs of its feet on top of the egg. But when the egg is pipped, the Gannet places its webs under the 
egg; otherwise the egg would be crushed and the chick squashed (Nelson 1978). What the clue of the 
egg implies depends on the other clues present, day length for the Herring Gull and the cracked surface 
and the sound of the unhatched chick for the Gannet. And in general the behaviour that a clue implies is 
the adaptive one, crucially depends on that part of the other circumstances or context that consists of 
clues. 
The idea of context has been actively presented by W. John Smith (e.g. 1977) in his studies on 
communication. However, context is not confined to communication, but is just as important to the way 
all animals, including these Herring Gull chicks, regulate all behaviour. It follows that the variables that 
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animals perceive must include all the available clues and that what animals interpret must be that part of 
what they have perceived that constitutes their information. 
A tortuous schedule 
Information changes continuously: it is not static. The time of day, day length (season), weather, the 
abundance and crypsis of prey, the sight of approaching predators and the way companions behave all 
change. The animal has the complicated task of keeping pace with this cornucopia of clues, each one of 
which changes according to its own tortuous schedule. 
Implication, species and individuals 
Do clues imply the same thing from one species to another and from one individual to another? 
Patterns of ultraviolet light contain important clues for honey bees and patterns of ultrasound contain 
important clues for some bats. No one has ever shown that any of these variables relates in any way to 
any human adaptive behaviour. Both Red Deer (Cervus elaphus) and Starlings (Sturnus vulgarus) refer 
to day length to regulate their time of fertilization, but Red Deer mate in October (Fletcher 1974) 
whereas Starlings mate in April (Dawson 1986). One assumes, therefore that Starlings interpret day 
length in the way that is best for Starlings while Red Deer do so in the way that is best for Red Deer. 
What is a clue to one animal may be irrelevant to another. And when the same variable is a clue to two 
animals, even then the significance is likely to vary. In general, the variables that are clues, the way they 
are clues and the behaviour that is adaptive all vary from species to species, at least in fine detail. 
Clues also differ in what they imply from individual to individual. For example a domestic cow leams 
to identify its own calf within a few minutes after giving birth and cannot thereafter by made to foster a 
similar calf (Lucretius c. 55 BC). Learning describes the general phenomenon that individuals change 
the way they respond to particular variables when such changes are adaptive and can only be found from 
experience (e.g. Thorpe 1963; Shettleworth 1984). 
Accumcy, reliability and signifcance 
Clues for flying to cover or for any other behaviour also vary in three other ways: accuracy, reliability 
and simcance. First, accuracy. The clues that relate to the adaptive time for a Herring Gull to breed 
include day length and dawn temperature. Dawn temperature is only as accurate as a weather forecast, 
whereas day length is potentially accurate to an astronomical degree. But what kind of day length is 
available for the Herring Gull? It is one whose accuracy varies with the incidence during the preceeding 
few days and weeks, of cloud cover at dawn and dusk, and also with the incidence of shadow in the 
place where the gull usually spends dawn and dusk. In general, clues always contain some residual 
error. Second, clues vary in their reliability. The sun and other celestial clues are very accurate, but 
clouds in an erratic way may hide them from a bird that at a particular time of day or season has to 
navigate as best it can. No matter what their accuracy celestial clues are sometimes not available at all. 
Clues of this intermittent kind are unreliable. Third, clues vary in their significance. A bird that 
overlooks a single itch to preen, perhaps a largely accurate clue, probably loses little in the way of 
survival or reproduction, whereas a single missed alarm call to seek cover from a predator may be fatal. 
And in deciding when to breed a Herring Gull that overlooked day length would be overlooking a clue 
that is highly accurate and where the consequences, success in rearing young, are important to the 
animals' contribution to future generations as well. The simcance of a clue is the change in the 
animals' expected contribution to future generations (see Fisher 1958) that would occur if the clue were 
overlooked or misinterpreted. Simcance depends on what job the particular behaviour does, as well as 
on the accuracy of the relation between the clue and the adaptive way. 
Summary 
What is adaptive information? It is the general assembly of clues, where a clue is a pattern of objects 
or events that relates to an adaptive way to behave. The behaviour that a clue relates to crucially 
depends on the rest of the assembly of available clues. Animals perceive clues, but what they interpret is 
information. Information changes continuously and the behaviour that it implies varies from species to 
species and also from individual to individual. Clues vary in three other ways: accuracy, reliability and 
sigmficance. Clues are permissive and do not themselves determine behaviour or influence it in any way 
at all. However, selection ensures that an animal's characters evolve until the animal does perceive clues 
and does interpret the resulting information such that it regulates its behaviour in an adaptive way. 
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3. HOW MUCH INFORMATION IMPROVES THE IMPLICATION? 
On hearing an alann call a bird flies to cover. Clearly whenever the adaptive way to behave is implied 
by only one clue, it will benefit the animal to refer to that clue. But sometimes two or more clues have 
implications for the same adaptive way to behave. For example, when a Herring Gull sees an egg in its 
nest various features of the egg relate to the behaviour of incubation. These include shape, size, colour 
and speckled pattern, all of which are clues for incubation. If one of these features changed, then 
incubation proceeds generally in the same way, but there is likely to be an increase in the time that the 
gull takes to decide to do so (Baerends & Kruijt 1973). It is as if the information about incubation has 
become less accurate, and that the delay in settling on the eggs to incubate them is some kind of measure 
of this change in accuracy. Each of these clues relates to the adaptive way to incubate, so they are 
redundant. In this case they probably relate to incubation in roughly the same way, so one is not 
surprised that the Herring Gull refers to all of them to roughly equal degree. What happens when clues 
are redundant and differ a good deal in the way they relate to the adaptive way to behave? 
Both day length and dawn temperature vary throughout the year in a regular way, and a certain pattern 
of each of these relates to the time of year that is adaptive for a particular species to start breeding. For 
some passerines that feed on insects it is adaptive in cold years to delay breeding, probably because of 
the same delay in the seasonal abundance of their prey. However, if one considers a seabird such as the 
Herring Gull, then the adaptive time to breed is unlikely to be delayed by an unseasonally low pattern of 
dawn temperature (Lack 1966). So one can assume for the Herring Gull that day length and dawn 
temperature are redundant clues, and as already mentioned, the variation from year to year in the 
relation between dawn temperature and the adaptive time to breed, is much greater than that of day 
length. If a clue of astronomical accuracy were available, referring to another clue could imply no 
increase in accuracy at all. However, as shown above even day length contains some residual error, and 
all or alrnost all information is only available in this kind of way where some increase in accuracy is 
possible. For a particular clue the residual error often can be expressed as a variance, and the accuracy 
can then be defined as the reciprocal of this variance. Where the error cannot be expressed as a variance, 
then accuracy will have to be expressed in a way that corresponds to the kind of error. 
Is there a way of combining a clue of poor accuracy (such as dawn temperature) with one of high 
accuracy (such as available day length), that will improve the estimate based on the high-accuracy clue 
alone? Where the clues are independent the way is straightforward. It consists of taking the mean of the 
two clues weighted inversely according to their respective variances (Appendix). Where the clues are 
partially correlated, the appendix shows that in all cases there is a way, a somewhat complicated one, 
that gives a better estimate than could be obtained by referring to the high-accuracy clue alone. This 
means that the accuracy implied by the information available will always be improved by one more clue 
even when that clue is redundant, partially correlated and inaccurate. Does this help to account for the 
animal's characters that perceive variables and interpret information? And do any predictions follow? 
4. HOW DOES PERCEPTION EVOLVE? 
How is one to account for the evolution of all or alrnost all sensory perception? In the beginning, to 
regulate a particular pattern of behaviour the animal could refer to the first clue that was available. How 
accurately could the animal regulate this behaviour? It could not do so more than the accuracy of the 
information itself. In other words the animal's physiology ought to evolve until given that information, 
the behaviour is as accurate as that of the information. In time other kinds of clues are likely to arise, so 
how will the animal's physiology evolve in these circumstances? In due course and by chance it will 
perceive the new clue and interpret the new clue by marginally changing the way it regulates its 
behaviour. Then selection ensures that this change will continue until it reaches the amount that is 
adaptive given the correlation and the variance of the new clue and that of the old one. The same 
reasoning applies to any number of new clues. On the other hand, if one had assumed that animals 
interpret a redundant clue by taking the simple mean of the two estimates then it is certainly possible to 
get a result that is worse than would have been obtained by referring to the more accurate clue alone. To 
illustrate this idea, the appendix shows that an animal that interprets a redundant clue in this way will 
improve its estimate only when the variance of the redundant clue is less than three times that of the first 
one. This reasoning probably accounts for the intuitive feeling that poor information can only adulterate 
good information. But if this were so, the initial interpretation of a second clue would always adulterate 
the interpretation of the first one and make it less accurate. And to regulate any pattern of behaviour no 
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animal could refer to more than one clue. The incubation behaviour of the Herring Gull mentioned 
above and much other behaviour shows that this is not so. 
During its life an animal comes across a tortuous schedule of information. For any information, the 
appendix shows how to weight each clue so as to calculate the best estimate of the adaptive way to 
behave. Over a number of generations the animal's characters that perceive and interpret this 
information evolve until the animal does infer what the information implies. 
5. WHAT PREDICTIONS FOLLOW? 
If one prevents an animal in an experiment from referring to one of its usual clues, what results will 
follow? First, the animal will still regulate its behaviour about the adaptive way, but the variance will 
now be larger. And secondly, because of the chance of sampling, in a few instances the animal that 
refers to fewer clues will approach closer to the adaptive way and not further away. These results will be 
easier to detect when the accuracy of the clues are similar, but will still occur whatever the respective 
accuracies. Consider the clues which pigeons use in navigating back to their loft. This question is not 
fully resolved. For example it is not agreed whether or not pigeons refer to olfactory clues (see Gould 
1982). In a recent experiment (Wiltschko, Wiltschko & Jahnel 1987) homing pigeons were released 
after treating their nasal cavities with a local anaesthetic so that they would be unable to perceive any 
olfactory clue. In this experiment the deviation of the mean directions from home in the treated birds 
increased slightly, but this effect was not completely consistent. Both the increase in deviation and its 
inconsistency accord in a qualitative way with the hypothesis that these pigeons use both kinds of clues. 
Current theory about how animals regulate their behaviour is encompassed by the ideas of causal 
factors and motivation. By Halliday's definition (1983, p. 106), '...A causal factor is any event, process 
or change in some condition which can be shown to activate, sustain or inhibit a particular behaviour 
pattern. Causal factors may be external stimuli, such as the appearance of a predator, the presentation of 
a mate, or internal states such as the level in blood of a hormone or of glucose. Internal and external 
causal factors interact to elicit behavio ur....' The combined state of all the internal causal factors is 
termed the animal's motivation. The way an animal responds to an external causal factor (such as the 
actions of its mate) varies according to its motivation or internal state. Note that a causal factor is 
defined as something which 'activates ...' a particular behaviour much as if it were some kind of agent. 
Current theory of behavioural regulation is concerned solely with the animal's characters that do the 
inferring. It describes what they are, what they respond to, what they do and how they do it. It does not 
say what is characteristic of the variables that the animal does refer to and what is characteristic of the 
ones that it ignores. That depends on the idea of adaptive information. By regarding causal factors as if 
they were agents, current theory effectively ignores the idea of information, and so has no road to the 
predictions that follow from it. 
Information is concerned with the relation between some pattern of objects or events and an adaptive 
way to behave. Any variable that relates to an adaptive way to behave is a clue for that behaviour, and 
one could in principle identify all those variables that are clues. Information then implies adaptive 
behaviour. And one assumes that the animal's characters have evolved until they now infer what the 
information implies. To do so the animal must refer to all the clues. So one predicts that the animals's 
characters have evolved until it now does refer to all the clues that it usually comes across (see Hume 
1739, p. 170 et seq). A second prediction is that the animal will disregard all variables that have only a 
random association with adaptive behaviour (see Hume 1739, p. 125). A third prediction is that it will 
interpret these clues in an adaptive way. To test these predictions in navigation or elsewhere means 
measuring the accuracy and variance of each clue by itself and in conjunction with the other clues 
available, a procedure that is rarely (if ever) carried out. 
Without information to refer to, no animal could regulate its behaviour no matter what characters it 
had. Nor could any animal regulate its behaviour without the characters that perceive clues and interpret 
information, no matter how accurate, reliable and significant the information. Information implies while 
characters infer. Animals need both. Note that behavioural ecology is about the conditions of life that in 
aggregate determine adaptive behaviour. But how is the animal to know what this is? Information is the 
sole resource. 
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6. SOME INFORMATION IS NOT FREE 
Information is not always as freely available as sensing day length, temperature or the sound of an alarm 
call. Sometimes it can be perceived only at a cost. A Barbary Dove (Streptopelia risoria) can monitor 
the approach of a predator at the cost of loss of feeding (Lendrem 1984), and in a contest a Red Deer 
stag can improve its estimate of its relative fighting ability by sampling one or more exchanges of roars 
or other displays, all of which incur some cost (Clutton-Brock & Albon 1979). How could one allow for 
the added complication of cost? 
For vigilance, one can do so in a straightforward way: at the adaptive compromise the combined cost 
of predation and starvation is a minimum. For a long drawn-out contest, the best way to fight is to 
obtain more information about only two clues, the best estimate, and its accuracy, of one's relative 
fighting ability, and to do so as cheaply as possible. Usually this is by a sequence of sampling and 
escalation. Eventually for one contestant the current estimate of relative fighting ability and its accuracy 
implies that the expected cost until the other contestant gives up is more than the value of the resource. 
At that point it is adaptive for the first contestant to give up (Enquist 1984; Leimar 1988). When 
information is not free, then its cost certainly does affect the adaptive way to behave. On some 
occasions, at least, one can indicate what this effect will be. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The animal's characters that perceive and interpret the world evolve until the animal infers what the 
information implies. This gives rise to three predictions. First, animals will refer to all the information; 
second, they will ignore variables that have only a random association with adaptive behaviour; and 
third, they will interpret information in an adaptive way. 
APPENDIX 
HOW POOR INFORMATION IMPROVES GOOD INFORMATION 
How should one combine two inaccurate estimates of the same quantity? Let us model the inaccurate 
estimates b two independent random variables X and Y with the same mean, p, but different variances 
o12 and 02. X and Y represent different (inaccurate) clues to the same quantity that is to be estimated. 
For example, X may be the correct breeding time as estimated by day length, and Y the correct breeding 
time as estimated by dawn temperature. These estimates have the same mean p (the correct date), but 
different accuracies, measured by the variances of X and Y. 
Naively, one might try averaging X and Y, that is, taking !h (X + Y) as the best estimate of the true 
quantity. However, the average is a more accurate estimate of p only if X and Y do not differ too much 
in accuracy - in particular, only if the variance of the less accurate clue (say Y) is less than three times 
that of the more accurate one. For, 
which is less than o12 when 022 < 3 6 1  . 
So, a simple average of two independent clues is not always useful. But there is always some 
weighted average of them that is an improvement over sim ly choosing the better one, as we now prove. 
Any weighted average hX + (1 - h) Y of them, for 0 1 f S 1, will also have mean p; is it possible to 
choose h so that the variance of hX + (1 - h) Y is less than the variances of both X and Y ? 
Indeed it is. Since the variables are independent, 
The derivative of this with respect to h is 2ho12 - 2(1-h) 022, which we equate to zero to find the 
minimum. Thus the choice of h which minimises the variance of hX + (1 - h) Y is: 
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That is, the most accurate estimate of p occurs when the measurements 
proportion to their variance (the more accurate one, with smaller variance, 
greater weight). 
The variance of h X + (1 - h) Y for this choice of h is: 
are weighted in (inverse) 
being of course given the 
This improvement in accuracy can be appreciable; it is greatest when X and Y have equal variance, in 
which case h = 'b, that is, one averages them. The variance of the average is then half the variance of X 
and Y. This means a 30% improvement in accuracy, if accuracy is measured by the standard deviation 
of the observations. This advantage increases if a weighted average of more than two sources of 
information is sed: the mean of n equally accurate independent observations of the same p has standard P deviation 11 n times the standard deviation of the individual observations. 
Note also that in the case of equal variances, any combination of the individual observations has a 
variance less than that of the observations themselves: combination of different sources can be an 
advantage even if the weightings are not entirely accurate. Further, the variance of the combination 
h X + (1 - h) Y is nowhere very sensitive to changes in the ratio of the standard deviations of X and Y, 
a 2 1 q  (a change of x% in 02 /a1  never makes more than a change of x% in the variance); thus the 
organism need not know the accuracy of its original estimates very well in order to take advantage of 
this method. 
What of the assumption in the above that X and Y are independent? 
It is reasonable in many cases to model inaccurate sources of information by independent random 
variables. Suppose, for example, a bird is to estimate the correct breeding date by combining its 
estimates of dawn temperature and day length. It can be expected that dawn temperature varies about its 
mean for a combination of many meteorological factors, and thus varies approximately normally. On the 
other hand, inaccuracies in the bird's estimate of day length would arise mainly from the inaccuracy of 
its internal clock. Although animals' estimates of daylength are very accurate, measurements of a few 
minutes' change in a day length of 24 hours cannot be perfect - there is a subtle interaction between a 
"free-running" internal mechanism and clues such as the diurnal pattern of light which reset the clock. 
Such measurement errors are usually distributed normally, and there seems no reason to suppose any 
serious dependence between them and variations in temperature. (In humans, time perception is 
influenced by body temperature, but only slightly: Conroy & Mills, 1970, pp. 108-111). Hence the 
inaccuracies in two sources of information can typically be presumed independent (and normal, though 
that is not relevant here), unless there is reason in a particular case to think otherwise. 
Departures from independence will be of significance, but will not necessarily prevent the combining 
of information from being beneficial. Take the case when Y is actually equal to X, and so contains no 
new information whatever. Then hX + (1 - h) Y is simply X, so its variance is just the variance of 
X (and Y). Therefore (in this special case) there is no disadvantage to the organism in combining 
information from these different sources, even if it is mistaken in regarding them as independent. 
One can ask in general whether there is ever a cost in combining information from two different 
sources as if they were independent. That is, if the organism uses the above rule to wei ht X and Y, but 
X and Y are in fact correlated instead of independent, can the variance of h X + (1 -5 Y exceed the 
variance of either X or Y? In fact it can, although even in the worst case the loss is not very large. The 
variance of h X + (1 - h) Y in general (not assuming independence), when h is chosen as above (to 
minimize variance, when independence is assumed), is: 
,. n 
(using standard results on correlation; see, e.g., Bickel & Doksum, 1977, p. 453). The worst case occurs 
when X and Y are perfectly correlated (Corr(X,Y) = 1) and the ratio of the standard deviations, 0210~  , 
is fi + 1, or about 2.4; in this case the standard deviation of the combination is about 1.2 01. Thus, 
even in the somewhat unrealistic worst case, when the organism mistakes perfectly correlated 
observations for independent ones, combining the observations as if they were independent results in 
only a 20% loss in accuracy as against using only the better source. 
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Nevertheless, 20% may be regarded as important, from the point of view of differential survival. 
Faced with this problem, there are three possible strategies for an organism: 
Strategy 1: Combine all uncertain sources of information as if they were independent, by combining 
them according to the simple weighting rule above. 
This strategy will be successful if, but only if, the sources of information being used are almost always 
independent (or nearly independent). It is conceivable that animals could have adopted this strategy by 
evolving means of acquiring information that result in independence most of the time (for example, by 
shielding the mechanisms of time perception from effects of changes in temperature). The strategy 
remains dangerous if there are in fact highly correlated sources of information in use. 
Strategy 2: Find out whether the sources are highly correlated; if so, use only the better one, and if not, 
weight as above. 
How correlated should "highly correlated" be in this context? One needs to know when taking the 
more accurate source (say X) gives a lower variance than taking the weighted combination with h 
chosen as above. The condition can be calculated as: 
1 Corr(X,Y) > ; ( 0 ~ / 0 ~ + ( 0 ~ / 0 ~ ) ~ )  
See figure 1: 
Figure 1 
For strategy 2, region where more accurate estimate 
alone should be taken, versus region where weighted 
average should be taken 
Strategy 3: If the organism knows whether the correlation is high or not, it probably has an estimate of 
the correlation, which it can use to achieve a better weighting of X and Y than the one that assumes 
independence. This is the optimal, though most complicated, strategy. One can calculate as above what 
choice of h gives the smallest variance for h X + (1 - h) Y, where h may now depend on the 
correlation. One finds that the best h is 
1 - Corr(X, Y) 0 1  102 
h = 
(01 /02)' + 1 - 2 Corr(X, Y) 01 102 
This weighting has a rather different effect in the high-correlation region (meaning the top left region, 
where the correlation is high compared to the ratio of the accuracies, that is Corr(X,Y) > 01/02), then it 
has in the low-correlation region, where Corr(X,Y) < 01/02 . See figure 2: 
Aduprive infonnation and animal behaviour 
Figure 2 
For strategy 3, region where more accurate estimate 
should be corrected by less accurate, versus 
region where weighted average should be taken. 
In the low-correlation region (bottom right), a weighted average of X and Y is taken, and the result is 
similar to that of strategy 2, but slightly more accurate. The strategies actually agree along the 
horizontal axis (where X and Y are independent) and along the right boundary (where ol = a2). But at 
the point (0.5, 0.3125) (which lies on the curve in figure I), strategy 2 indicates taking X only, giving a 
variance of 0 1  2, while the combination given in strategy 3 has a variance of 0 . 9 6 ~ ~  2. This is about a 2% 
improvement in accuracy, as measured by the standard deviation. This could be considered a worthwhile 
improvement in some circumstances. 
In the high-correlation region, h is greater than 1, that is, 1 - h is negative. This requires a change in 
interpretation. The expression hX + (1 - h) Y is no longer a "weighted average" of X and Y. Instead, 
the inaccurate source, Y, is actually given negative weight. What this means is that the more accurate 
measurement, from source X, is corrected by the observation Y by going in the opposite direction to that 
suggested by Y. This initially bizarre result can be explained as follows: Suppose an animal is 
measuring a quantity, say today's dawn temperature, by two methods. X, the accurate one, reads 73O; Y, 
the inaccurate one, reads 75'. The animal also knows that X and Y are very highly correlated (so that the 
readings tend to be both too high or both too low). It should argue that since the inaccurate one is 
higher, both readings are almost certainly too high; hence it should comct the more accurate one, 73', 
by lowering it. In theory, if the correlation were perfect, one could achieve zero variance, or perfect 
accuracy: if the error in 75' is known to be twice the error in 73', then the best estimate must be 71'. 
Such high comlations are of course not to be expected in the wild. Nevertheless, negative weightings of 
inaccurate sources are an unexpected prediction of the theory that all sources of information are referred 
to. 
The calculations required by this model are well within the capabilities of the brain of higher animals. 
The human brain has been observed to be an effective "intuitive statistician", in combining information 
in subconscious ways which are presumably independent of specifically human abilities like language 
(Peterson & Beach 1967; Kelley, 1973). This is to be expected from the brain's neurd network 
architecture, which is perfectly adapted to computing weighted averages of inputs, with the weights 
being tunable by evolution and individual experience. (Smolensky 1986, Hinton & Anderson 1989, 
ch. 1). Also, contrary to appearances, calculating a correlation is very easy, as a correlation is simply 
the degree of pattern match between two series of observations. That is, the organism only needs to 
notice if two qualities vary together. Of course organisms do this accurately all the time in inductive 
reasoning and prediction, which involve first correlating past co-occurrences of a phenomenon and a 
sign of it. Various classical experiments on conditioning do indeed confirm that rats are very accurate 
in their estimates of covariation (summary in Holland et al. 1986, section 5.2.1). It follows that 
experiments with rats could be devised to test which, if any, of the strategies just outlined are followed, 
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but we leave doing so to those more skilled in experimental design. Experiments with robots that rely on 
many sensors will also cast light on good strategies for combining uncertain information; investigations 
have begun, but are in the early stages (Luo, 1990). 
From the evolutionary point of view, once the initial investment of a powerful brain has been made, 
the cost of information processing in combining information as outlined here is small. It would 
certainly be incredible if animals' characters had not evolved to take advantage of these simple means of 
increasing the accuracy of information. 
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